Industrial OT/ICS Security
Cybersecurity assessment for operational technology environments and industrial control systems.
Industrial cybersecurity cannot be approached with the same tools or criteria as IT cybersecurity. OT systems have 15-25 year lifecycles, operate with proprietary protocols (Modbus, DNP3, OPC UA), and frequently cannot be patched without stopping production. The most critical finding across 35+ assessed plants is the absence of effective segmentation between IT and OT networks: in many cases, an attacker compromising an office workstation can reach a programmable logic controller (PLC) in fewer than 3 network hops. The assessment follows the IEC 62443 zones and conduits model, verifying actual segmentation (not diagrammed), access controls to control systems, shared account management (endemic in OT environments), and anomaly detection capability in industrial traffic. The goal is not to apply IT standards to an OT environment — it is to design controls proportional to actual physical and operational risk.
Deliverables
IT/OT convergence assessment
Attack surface mapping in the convergence zone.
Segmentation audit
Verification of effective separation between IT and OT networks.
OT protection plan
Prioritized recommendations to protect industrial environments.
Intervention Flow
OT reconnaissance
OT asset inventory, protocols and network topology.
Controls assessment
Review of segmentation, access, patching and monitoring.
Report and roadmap
Risk-classified findings with prioritized improvement plan.
Technical Inquiries
Yes. The assessment covers the most relevant protocols in LATAM industrial environments: Modbus TCP/RTU, DNP3, OPC UA/DA, EtherNet/IP, PROFINET, and BACnet, among others. What is critical is not just knowing the protocol but understanding how it is exploited in a real attack. Modbus, for example, has no native authentication — any device on the network can send write commands to a PLC if adequate segmentation does not exist. The assessment verifies not only which protocols are in use but how they are protected in the operational environment.
No. The assessment is specifically designed to not impact operations. Passive industrial traffic monitoring techniques, configuration reviews, and interviews with operators and control engineers are used. Active tests on production control systems are never executed. Segmentation findings are verified through topology analysis and traffic captures, not through access attempts that could affect a PLC or SCADA system in operation.