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Security audit of Operational Technology (OT) networks in 35 industrial plants across energy, manufacturing, and utilities sectors in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile revealed that 82% of critical networks lack effective segmentation from the corporate network (IT). In 68% of cases, it was possible to reach critical Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) from the administrative network via simple lateral movements in under 4 hours of controlled penetration testing. Insecure industrial protocols (Modbus TCP, unencrypted DNP3) were detected in 94% of OT networks without secure encapsulation. 76% of SCADA systems run on obsolete, unsupported operating systems (Windows 7/XP) that cannot be patched. IEC 62443 standard evaluation showed an average maturity level 1 (initial) compliance in 71% of plants, with critical deficiencies in third-party account management (maintenance vendors with unsupervised remote access in 88% of cases).
Central questions answered with verifiable data from the study.
Not in 82% of cases. Jumping from corporate to industrial networks is possible in under 4 hours in 68% of plants.
Obsolete OS (76%), insecure protocols (94%), and unsupervised vendor remote access (88%).
Level 1 (Initial) of IEC 62443 in 71% of plants.
Steps completed, sources consulted, and evidence collected during the study.
Normative and theoretical framework: IEC 62443 (series 2-1, 3-2, 3-3); NIST SP 800-82r3 (Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security); Purdue Reference Model; CIS Controls v8 (IG2/IG3 adapted to OT).
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